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Allocating Resources within a Big City 
School District: New York City after 
Campaign for Fiscal Equity v. New York 
 
In 2003 the New York State Court of Appeals ruled in Campaign 
for Fiscal Equity v. New York that New York State was not 
meeting its constitutional obligation to provide a “sound basic 
education” in New York City schools (see Duncombe, 
Lukemeyer, and Yinger, CPR Policy Brief No. 28/2004, for a 
summary of the case). In November 2004, a court-appointed 
panel of special masters reported that the additional operating 
cost was approximately $5.6 billion per year (Feerick, Milonas, 
and Thompson 2004). 
The total amount of new funding required for New York City 
public schools has been the focus of extraordinary study and 
debate. But relatively little attention has focused on how these 
additional resources will be distributed across schools within 
New York City. The CFE decision requires New York State to 
provide adequate educational funding to New York City, but it 
does not specify that individual schools within the district receive 
adequate funding. Thus, even if New York City receives 
adequate funding at the district level, it is possible that adequate 
resources will still not reach those schools serving students with 
the greatest needs, especially if future spending follows historical 
spending patterns. In small school districts with only a handful of 
schools, disparities across schools are of little consequence, but 
they can be enormously important in a large district such as New 
York City, which serves more than 1,000,000 students in over 
1,300 schools. 
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In this brief we take a closer look at the mechanisms used to 
distribute resources across schools. This brief summarizes and 
builds upon the authors’ ongoing work with Leanna Stiefel and 
Amy Ellen Schwartz investigating the intradistrict distribution of 
resources within large school districts. We first present what we 
know about the current distribution of educational resources 
within New York City and other large city districts. Then we 
discuss current efforts to promote greater equity in the 
distribution of resources and improve student performance. We 
conclude with lessons and policy implications for New York 
State as it implements the CFE decision in New York City. These 
findings also apply to other large districts in the state, such as 
Buffalo, Rochester, Syracuse, and Albany. 
Our focus in this brief is on vertical equity—ensuring that 
schools serving students with different levels of needs receive 
appropriately different levels of resources—rather than adequacy. 
But the two concepts are closely related. If we ensure that 
students with a variety of needs have ample resources to achieve 
agreed upon educational goals, we will achieve both school-level 
adequacy and vertical equity. 
Previous Research and Litigation 
The growing focus on schools as the locus of accountability, 
combined with better data availability, has led to increased 
attention to the level and distribution of resources at the school 
level. A small amount of research on this topic dates back to the 
1970s and 1980s (Summers and Wolfe 1976; Ginsburg, 
Moskowitz, and Rosenthal 1981). Most of the available evidence, 
however, has accumulated since the mid-1990s. 
Most school finance litigation, such as the CFE case, has focused 
on state formulas to distribute resources across school districts, 
but a large urban school district can itself be the target of 
litigation over the distribution of funding across individual 
schools within the district. The Los Angeles Unified School 
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District faced such a lawsuit, Rodriguez v. LAUSD (1992), in 
which plaintiffs argued that schools in poorer Los Angeles 
neighborhoods had less experienced and less educated teachers—
and therefore lower funding—than schools in wealthier 
neighborhoods. The district entered into a consent decree in 1992 
that required greater equalization across schools. Some evidence 
suggests that the case has resulted in greater funding equity 
across schools, though not greater equalization of teacher 
experience (Sugarman 2002). 
Disparities Uncovered 
In a comprehensive overview of research on school-level 
resource distribution, Stiefel and colleagues (2004) identify 
almost 20 studies dating back over 25 years examining the 
school-level distribution of various resources, including dollars, 
teacher-pupil ratios, and teacher characteristics. A number of 
studies (for example, Summers and Wolfe 1976; Rubenstein 
1998; Iatarola and Stiefel 2003) examine resource allocations 
across schools within a single large school district, while others 
(such as Clark 1998; Stiefel, Rubenstein, and Berne 1998) 
examine the distribution within (but not across) several large 
districts. Still others (such as Betts, Rueben, and Danenberg 
2000; Burke 1999; Hertert 1996) use school-level data to 
compare resources across schools in different districts.  
Across-District Studies Mask Across-School Disparities 
The studies looking across districts find that district-level 
averages typically understate the level of disparities that exists 
across schools within the districts. 
• For example, Hertert (1996) compares per pupil expenditures 
in California across districts, across schools (ignoring districts), 
and across schools within districts, and finds that differences 
between schools in different districts are substantially greater 
than average spending differences between districts. 
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• Owens and Maiden (1999) examine the distribution of 
instructional expenditures across districts and schools in Florida 
and find substantially larger disparities between schools than 
between districts. They also find that, at the school level, the 
higher the percentage of African American students and students 
eligible for subsidized or free lunches, the lower the level of 
instructional expenditures.  
Sometimes higher concentrations of students with special needs, 
such as low-income students, are associated with higher levels of 
per pupil spending. 
• For example, Schwartz (1999) uses data on over 3,000 schools 
in Ohio for the 1995-1996 school year and finds that, controlling 
for district fixed effects, higher student poverty is associated with 
higher spending, with an even stronger relationship when the 
sample is limited to the state’s largest urban districts. 
• In their review of the research on intradistrict resource 
allocation, Stiefel and colleagues (2004) find a significant 
positive relationship in 5 of 11 school-level studies examining the 
relationship between spending and poverty, with significant 
negative relationships in only 2 studies. However, these findings 
come with the caveat that expenditure data alone may mask a 
tradeoff between quality and quantity of resources. 
Teacher Quantity-Quality Tradeoff in High-Poverty Schools 
The growing availability of school-level personnel data has made 
it easier for researchers to analyze the number and type of staff 
employed across schools, to determine whether a quantity-quality 
tradeoff takes place. A common finding in research examining 
the distribution of teachers is that high-poverty schools often 
have more teachers relative to pupils, but that these teachers are 
generally more inexperienced and educated and, thus, lower paid. 
• As early as the 1970s, Summers and Wolfe (1976) found 
significantly lower education levels and teacher exam scores in 
Ross Rubenstein and Lawrence Miller 
5 
schools with higher poverty and higher proportions of black 
students in Philadelphia.  
• Several years later, Ginsburg and colleagues (1981) examined 
the distribution of teacher inputs (professionals and 
paraprofessionals per 1,000 pupils, teacher education, experience, 
and salary) in relation to special needs students (minority, low-
income, low test scores) for New York State schools for 1976-
1977. They found more professionals and paraprofessionals per 
student in high-poverty and high-minority schools, but the 
teachers in these schools tended to have less experience and 
lower salaries.  
• Stiefel and colleagues (1998) provide an overview of 
intradistrict resource allocation research in Chicago, New York 
City, Rochester, and Fort Worth and report low variations in base 
funding across schools in each city, but also find lower teacher 
salaries in high-poverty schools, sometimes offset by more staff 
relative to pupils in those schools.  
• Similarly, Rubenstein (1998) examines the distribution of 
budget dollars per pupil across Chicago schools, separated by 
funding source (General Fund, Special Education, Desegregation, 
state Chapter 1) and school level (elementary vs. high schools). 
He finds that both high- and low-poverty elementary and high 
schools receive similar General Fund positions per pupil, but that 
average teacher salaries are significantly lower in higher poverty 
schools, leading to lower General Fund dollar allocations in the 
higher poverty schools (particularly elementary schools).  
• Betts and colleagues (2000) compare California schools in 
1997-1998 and find relatively little variation in average class 
sizes across schools but large differences in teacher qualifications 
as measured by experience, education, and credentialing. They 
also find relatively large variations in the number of advanced 
placement (AP) courses offered and in the percentage of courses 
that satisfy public university entrance requirements.  
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• Ingersoll (2002) uses the three Schools and Staffing Survey 
(SASS) datasets to compare school characteristics and teacher 
qualifications and finds that teachers in high-poverty, high-
minority schools tend to have lower qualifications and are far 
more likely to be assigned to teach classes that they have not 
majored in.  
• Roza and Hill (2004) examine within-district differences in 
dollars spent per school for Baltimore City, Baltimore County, 
Cincinnati, and Seattle and report that teachers in low-poverty 
schools and those in high-performing schools tend to have higher 
average salaries than do teachers in high-poverty and low-
performing schools. They also find that schools with the most 
applicants for teacher positions have the highest paid teachers, 
because they have the most choices and therefore hire more 
experienced and educated teachers. They argue that the allocation 
of Title I resources to hire teachers compounds the inequity 
because schools with lower-paid teachers subsidize schools with 
higher-paid teachers.  
Financial Reporting Masks Variations across Schools 
The ways in which data are reported, such as reporting only a 
fraction of district expenditures at the school level, and using 
average costs can often mask real resource variations across 
schools. 
• Roza and colleagues (2005) report that in Denver only 45 
percent of the district’s operating budget is reported in individual 
school budgets while the rest is reported at the district level. 
Approximately one-quarter of these centrally-reported district 
expenditures, though, represent shared resources used to provide 
services across multiple schools (for example, bilingual education 
services). When the researchers allocated these shared resources 
to individual schools, the services accounted for an additional 
$1,000 in spending per pupil, on average. Their findings suggest 
that transparency may play a direct role in improving equity 
between schools, as the more transparent school budgets were 
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distributed more equitably than the much more opaque centrally-
reported budgets. 
• In addition, the common practice of reporting average rather 
than actual teacher salaries by school can hide substantial 
resource differences. Roza and Hill (2004) report that if all 
schools received funding for only an average teacher salary for 
each teacher position, schools above and below the salary 
average would lose or gain 4 to 6 percent of their budgets, with 
gains of over a half million dollars and losses close to $1 million 
for schools at the extremes. 
Studies of New York City 
As the largest district in the nation, and one in which detailed 
schools site resource data has been collected, New York City has 
increasingly become a focus of research on school-level 
resources. 
• Iatarola and Stiefel (2003) explore the intradistrict equity of 
inputs and outputs, including expenditures, teacher resources, and 
performance across 840 elementary and middle schools in New 
York City in 1997-1998. They find that disparities in resources at 
the school level are generally greater than those reported for 
interdistrict studies (particularly in middle schools). Similar to 
results in other cities, the authors also find that elementary 
schools with higher proportions of students with special needs 
(with the exception of immigrant status) tend to have more 
teachers per student, but with lower salaries. They find similar 
results for schools with higher proportions of non-white students 
in both elementary and middle schools.  
• Stiefel and colleagues (2004) estimate de facto spending 
models to assess the factors that appear to drive resource 
allocations across New York City elementary and middle 
schools. Consistent with previous studies, they find significantly 
higher teacher-pupil ratios in high-poverty schools, but 
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significantly lower salaries, less teacher experience, and lower 
percentages of teachers with master’s degrees and full licenses.  
• Lankford, Loeb, and Wyckoff (2002) use data for all of New 
York State to explore teacher sorting and report that urban areas 
generally have less qualified teachers than non-urban areas and 
that, within large urban districts, low-performing, poor, and non-
white children are more likely to have teachers who are not 
certified and who have failed certification exams. They conclude 
that teacher transfers and quits may exacerbate these differences 
as teachers, particularly those with the most skills, are more 
likely to leave urban schools with many poor students. 
Much categorical funding, such as federal Title I funding, is 
intended to provide supplemental resources in high-poverty 
schools, but allocation methods at the district level often limit 
these effects.  
• Brown (2005) examines Title I allocations in the three largest 
U.S. school districts and finds that New York City was the only 
district of the three being compared (LAUSD and Chicago were 
the other two) in which Title I funds appear to supplement state 
and local funds. In addition, though, Brown finds that New York 
City fails to meet the vertical equity intent of Title I funding as 
schools with higher concentrations of poor pupils did not receive 
higher Title I funding per pupil. Moreover, there were wide 
ranging anomalies in the allocation of Title I including one 
school that received $4,864 per pupil, or nearly seven times the 
average per pupil allocation.  
Summary of Research Findings 
In sum, the existing studies on school-level resource disparities in 
New York City and elsewhere have often reached remarkably 
similar conclusions. 
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1. Resource disparities found across schools may be as large 
as or larger than the more widely recognized disparities 
across districts.  
2. These disparities are generally not explained by 
differences in school and student characteristics. On the 
contrary, schools with greater student needs often find 
themselves disadvantaged relative to other schools in the 
same district, particularly in terms of the quality of 
teacher resources.  
3. These patterns are not caused by the intentional targeting 
of resources to lower-need schools, but are frequently the 
result of position-based funding formulas, average cost 
budgeting practices, and teacher sorting patterns that 
allow higher paid teachers to systematically opt into 
lower-need schools without financial ramifications for the 
schools they transfer from or to. 
The next section addresses efforts and proposals to address these 
school-level disparities. 
Alternative School-Based Funding Systems 
Current Allocation Methods in New York City 
Resources are allocated to schools in New York City through a 
series of formulas based largely on each school’s student register 
and number of students with special needs.  
Base Instructional Allocation 
Most funding (82 percent of school-level allocations in FY 2005) 
is allocated through the Base Instructional Allocation (see NYC 
Department of Education 2004 for details). The Base 
Instructional Allocation consists of three components: 
1. a school overhead allocation to fund a principal and 
selected other administrative personnel;  
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2. a base teacher allocation, which divides each school’s 
general and special education register by maximum class 
sizes for each grade and program to calculate the number 
of teachers required (as well as adjustments for such 
factors as teacher prep and lunch periods, frequency of 
course offerings, and “breakage,” that is, additional 
teachers needed when the student register does not divide 
evenly by the maximum class size); and  
3. a per capita allocation to fund other basic needs such as 
assistant principals, paraprofessionals, aides, and 
instructional supplies. 
The remainder of each school’s allocation is provided through a 
series of specialized formulas targeting students with special 
needs (such as students with limited English proficiency and 
those eligible for free lunch), specific types of schools (for 
example, new schools, schools under registration review), certain 
grades (for example, early grades class size reduction) and 
specific types of expenditures (such as school-based support 
teams).  
An important aspect of the base teacher allocation is that each 
school budgets for average, not actual, teacher salaries. 
Therefore, all things being equal, schools with higher paid 
teachers do not face a tighter budget constraint than those with 
lower paid teachers, and schools with lower paid teachers do not 
have additional resources for other purposes.  
Proposed or Implemented Allocation Options 
The review below discusses several options that have been 
proposed or implemented to address potential inequities that may 
arise from such a position-based funding system. 
Weighted Student Funding 
In recent years, several large districts around the country have 
taken steps to reduce their reliance on traditional position-based 
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allocation formulas by introducing weighted student budgeting 
(Miles and Roza 2005). Drawing on experience in Edmonton, 
Alberta, districts in Seattle, Houston, Cincinnati, and San 
Francisco have begun implementing weighted student allocation 
formulas in recent years (Archer 2004).  
Weighted student funding formulas hold considerable promise 
for reducing intradistrict resource disparities. Miles and Roza 
(2005) examine school-level equity before and after the 
implementation of these funding systems in Cincinnati and 
Houston and find that funding disparities unrelated to student 
characteristics were virtually eliminated in Cincinnati and 
decreased slightly in Houston. They conclude that details matter; 
the choice of student weights and the share of district resources 
allocated through the formula will affect the degree to which 
equity goals are achieved. The use of district average teacher 
salaries (average costs) instead of actual school site teacher 
salaries (real costs) continues to hinder intradistrict equity gains 
in the districts that have implemented weighted student funding, 
however. Oakland, California, which has begun the process of 
charging schools actual rather than district average teacher 
salaries in conjunction with the use of the system, is a notable 
exception (Archer 2004).  
Intradistrict allocation formulas based on teacher positions, such 
as those currently in place in New York City, complicate efforts 
to enhance school-level resource equity, as schools may compete 
for the most educated and experienced (i.e, highest paid) teachers 
with no financial penalty. Odden and Busch (1998) recommend 
that schools be charged actual teacher salaries, but with a seven-
year phase-in period. Similarly, Roza and Hill (2004) recommend 
that states fund children, rather than districts or schools, with 
funding following children to their schools. Such a student-based 
approach also has implications for systems employing enhanced 
public or private school choice (Rubenstein and Picus 2003).  
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Weighted student funding is often implemented along with more 
general decentralization efforts designed to provide enhanced 
management and resource allocation discretion to school 
personnel. Ouchi (2004) reports that in three large districts using 
traditional budgeting systems, the percentage of the school’s 
budget under the discretion of the principal ranged from 19.1 
percent in Chicago to 6.1 percent in New York City. Conversely, 
in three districts using a weighted student funding system, the 
proportion of the budget controlled by the school’s principal 
ranged between 59 and 92 percent. While a weighted student 
formula could, in theory, be implemented without decentralizing 
budgetary control, the system provides important new 
opportunities for school personnel to control the use of resources 
and, in particular, the mix of staff, at the school site. 
School-Based Funding 
While weighted student formulas typically focus on the methods 
that districts use to allocate resources across schools, a number of 
researchers have advocated changing state funding formulas by 
moving the basic unit of support from the district to the school. 
Such a “school-based funding” system would largely remove the 
discretion of school districts to re-allocate funds across schools. 
For example, Guthrie (1997) has proposed a school-based 
financing system, with 90 percent pass-through of funds to the 
school site, including capital outlays. He also recommends that 
schools be given discretion for purchasing and other resource 
allocation decisions. Similarly, Hess (1995) discusses problems 
with examining equity from only a district-level perspective and 
proposes a school-based funding system in which 85 percent of 
district funds are allocated to the school site. Hess simulates the 
funding under such a system, which would result in a range of 
expenditure levels of no more than 1.45:1 across all schools.  
Allan Odden has written most extensively and in the greatest 
detail about the structure of a school-based funding system. For 
example, in Odden (2001) he argues that states in the U.S. should 
follow England’s lead in creating need-based school (rather than 
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district) funding formulas. The formulas can include a base 
amount per pupil, with adjustments for student needs, grade level 
differences, and particular school needs.  
Odden and Busch (1998) review three existing examples of 
school-based financing: charter schools, the Australian model, 
and the British model (for other useful overviews of the 
Australian and British systems see Hill 1997; Caldwell 1997). 
Victoria, Australia, began school-based financing in 1993, with 
approximately 87 percent of funding budgeted at the school site. 
Schools have the ability to determine their own staffing mix (i.e., 
regular teachers, specialists, support staff) or convert a teacher 
position to a cash allotment to be used for other purposes. In 
England, school-based funding has been in place since the late 
1980s, though funds flow through Local Education Agencies 
(LEAs). Approximately 85 percent of the budget is allocated 
directly from the central government to schools as a lump sum. 
LEAs are required to determine funding formulas, with at least 
80 percent based on “age weighted pupil units,” though LEAs 
can develop their own formulas for calculating these pupil units 
and schools are charged for actual teacher salaries.  
Based on experience in these districts, Odden and Busch (1998) 
develop proposals for a school-based funding system in the 
United States. They suggest that districts would be required to 
identify functions to be devolved to schools and those retained by 
the district, determine the portion of resources to go with these 
devolved functions, and develop formulas to allocate the 
resources to schools. The state would retain authority to structure 
the ways in which districts can develop these school funding 
formulas.  
Improving School-Level Resource Reports 
One of the biggest challenges that researchers continue to face 
when examining intradistrict resource allocation patterns is the 
availability of school-level data. According to a recent survey by 
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Education Week, 23 states collect school-level financial 
information, suggesting at least moderate demand for such 
information. A generally accepted method of accounting for 
school-level resources does not exist, though, and this ambiguity 
fuels mounting concerns about how to report costs among our 
nation’s schools (Archer 2004, Educational Testing Service 
2004).  
Efforts to address weaknesses in school-level data have resulted 
in several proposals aimed at improving the transparency and 
usability of school-level resources (see Chambers 1999; Odden et 
al. 2003); however, school budgets do not include many centrally 
reported resources that appear instead in consolidated central 
department budgets, making it difficult to determine which 
schools ultimately benefit from them. 
One model, developed by Coopers & Lybrand and implemented 
in New York City in 1994, accounts for a greater share of district 
resources at the school level by allocating costs based on the 
face-to-face principle. With this model, only the cost of personnel 
that physically work within schools is reported at the school 
level, while administration and operations costs associated with 
central services remain centrally reported (Coopers & Lybrand 
1994). While this strategy facilitates reporting a greater portion of 
shared resources at the school level than is typically reported, 
some within-district variation is lost and analysis of effective 
resource use becomes more difficult (Miller, Roza, and Swartz 
2005). For reporting purposes it may be most useful to show 
school site spending both with and without these indirect cost 
allocations. 
A recent National Center for Education Statistics publication 
calls for districts to allocate all spending to schools, including 
district administrative and school board costs. The rationale states 
that “the provision of educational services through operation of 
schools is the only product of a school district [and] the 
allocation of these costs is necessary to full costing of the schools 
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and their programs” (National Forum on Education Statistics 
2003). No cost allocation model has yet been developed to 
execute the recommendation; however, a recent paper by Miller, 
Roza, and Swartz (2005) proposes a model by which typical 
school budget data are supplemented with spending data on 
centrally reported resources, both of which are then classified by 
student type, to enable comparisons of spending differences 
between schools.  
New York City after Campaign for Fiscal Equity v. New 
York 
The remainder of this brief discusses policy alternatives for New 
York City as it works toward achieving adequacy and equity for 
all of its students. 
Researchers have consistently found staff-based allocation 
systems used to allocate resources from the central office to the 
schools to be highly inequitable. These findings have led to a 
search for alternative mechanisms, and no other alternative has 
garnered more interest than weighted student funding.  
Weighted Student Funding 
New York City could follow the lead of districts such as 
Edmonton, Cincinnati, Seattle, Oakland, San Francisco, and 
Houston in implementing a weighted student funding formula. 
Weighted student funding systems shift the focus from the 
resource being allocated, teachers for example, to the recipient of 
the resources, the student. All students start with an equal amount 
of base level funding; students with special needs (e.g., English 
language learners, students with learning or physical disabilities) 
receive higher funding to equate the cost of their education with 
the amount of resources the school actually receives.  
The potential benefits of this system include a high level of 
vertical equity and greater transparency. The success of a 
weighted student funding system ultimately hinges on a number 
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of important details that the district would need to consider, 
including teacher distribution, calculation of appropriate weights, 
and accounting for economies and diseconomies of scale 
(discussed below). 
Teacher Distribution 
Ensuring an equitable distribution of teachers while still 
protecting teachers’ workplace rights presents one of the most 
vexing challenges for school-based funding systems. As 
described earlier, much of the disparity in resources across 
schools may be attributable to the sorting of teachers and the 
resulting strong correlations between teacher characteristics and 
student characteristics. Teacher preferences, in particular, may 
often work against recruitment efforts in urban districts, and 
against schools within districts serving students who may be 
perceived as being more “difficult” (Lankford, Wyckoff, and 
Loeb 2002).  
Moving from position-based to dollar-based funding on its own 
might not be sufficient to affect the distribution of teachers 
significantly unless districts choose to eliminate average cost 
budgeting practices as well. If schools work with budgets in 
dollars rather than positions, they would be forced to make 
tradeoffs between the quantity and the “quality” of teachers in the 
school (to the extent that quality is associated with observable 
characteristics such as experience and education that are 
rewarded in teacher salary schedules). With existing teacher 
salary schedules, this would not, however, change existing 
teacher incentives to choose schools they perceive as having the 
most desirable work environment. Therefore, it is quite possible 
that schools serving fewer students with special needs would 
continue to hire fewer higher-paid teachers while schools with 
more special needs students could hire additional teachers, but 
would largely be left with newer and less-educated teachers.  
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Two potential elements of a student-based formula could affect 
teacher assignments, though. First, student weighting would 
provide relatively more funding to schools serving more students 
with special needs and relatively less funding to other schools. 
Therefore, under a weighted student formula schools with fewer 
“high-weight” students would lack the resources to hire large 
numbers of the highest paid teachers, potentially increasing the 
supply of such teachers for high-need schools. Second, a 
weighted student formula could be implemented along with a 
system of differential pay for teachers working in the hardest-to-
staff schools and grades. Differential teacher pay would be, 
perhaps, the most controversial proposal described here, and 
would be quite difficult to implement under existing collective 
bargaining agreements (unions in some urban districts, though, 
such as Denver, have approved differential pay for hard-to-staff 
schools). One possibility for implementing such a proposal 
within current arrangements is for the state, rather than New 
York City, to set aside a portion of any funding increase to 
support bonuses for teachers agreeing to work in schools with the 
greatest needs (Ballou 2004). It is unclear, though, how large 
these bonuses would need to be; the limited evidence on wage 
differentials suggests they could be quite large (Odden and Kelly 
2000; Hanushek, Kain, and Rivkin 2004).  
The ability to identify high performing teachers is critical to 
accurately evaluate current teacher distribution patterns and 
policies, such as wage differentials, aimed at improving the 
equity of teacher distribution. Recent research on nationally 
certified teachers finds that teachers who earn national 
certification are at least marginally more effective than both 
average teachers and teachers who sought, but failed to earn, this 
certification. Furthermore, applicants who earn certification 
appear more effective at raising student achievement and have a 
greater impact on low-income students (Goldhaber and Anthony 
2004). Unfortunately, only 12 percent of nationally certified 
teachers teach in high-poverty schools (greater than 75 percent 
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free or reduced priced lunch) (Humphrey, Koppich, and Hough 
2005).  
Determining Appropriate Student Weights 
A growing literature has examined the cost of providing an 
adequate education for students, with much of the work focusing 
on New York and other states embroiled in adequacy litigation 
(see, for example, Duncombe and Yinger 1997; Duncombe, 
Lukemeyer, and Yinger 2004; Chambers et al. 2004). While 
detailed discussion of the methods used to estimate adequate 
funding levels is outside the scope of this brief (see Duncombe, 
Lukemeyer, and Yinger 2004 for an excellent overview and 
critique of methods used to estimate adequate funding), selection 
of appropriate funding weights is crucial if adequate resources 
are to reach students. While the majority of adequacy studies 
have focused on school districts rather than schools within 
districts, the weights derived from these studies may be 
appropriate starting points for developing funding formulas. 
Unlike the ad hoc weights often found in state and district-level 
formulas, the student weights derived from these adequacy 
studies are empirically linked to student performance levels. The 
weights found in many funding formulas often represent political 
compromises rather than empirically derived decisions regarding 
the appropriate level of funding for different types of students. 
Thus, to the extent that shifting to a new weighting system 
produces winners and losers, it is likely to be politically 
controversial.  
Estimating appropriate weights is also complicated by issues of 
marginal and average costs, particularly at different enrollment 
levels. For example, the marginal cost for serving the first student 
with limited English proficiency can be expected to be 
considerably higher than the cost for serving the tenth such 
student. Conversely, high concentrations of students with special 
needs (for example, students from low-income families) could 
result in higher marginal costs per student. Using weights based 
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only on average costs may result in under-funding or over-
funding certain schools. Several alternatives are possible to 
address this issue. One possibility is to include higher funding 
weights for schools with low incidence of certain student needs, 
or to fund those schools on a cost reimbursement basis, as is 
often done with low-incidence special education services. 
Another option is to start with a base funding amount for the 
fixed costs associated with running a special program, and then to 
allocate weighted per pupil funding in addition to the base. To 
address higher costs from higher concentrations of students with 
special needs, the formula could include higher per pupil weights 
for schools over a certain threshold, for example schools in which 
more than 60 percent of the students are from low-income 
families. Since low-performing students in New York tend to be 
heavily concentrated in a small number of schools (Boyd, 
Lankford, and Loeb 2004), it may be particularly important to 
focus additional resources on these schools. 
A related issue is how districts identify student needs for the 
purposes of funding. New York City collects quite detailed data 
on student characteristics, including unique data such as the 
percentage of recent immigrants and their home countries. These 
data provide an opportunity for the district to effectively target 
subpopulations of students. Again, though, the effectiveness of 
such targeting is dependent on how the district chooses to define 
student needs (for example, federal Title I funding in New York 
City is currently distributed based on proportions of students 
eligible for free but not reduced price lunches, thereby targeting 
schools serving only the poorest children [Brown 2005]), and the 
appropriateness of funding weights assigned to these children. 
Small Schools 
Unless it accounts for potentially higher costs associated with 
small size, a weighted student funding formula could 
disadvantage small schools, many of which have opened over the 
past several years and are currently being developed in New York 
City. New York City is not alone in turning to small schools as a 
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reform strategy; Los Angeles and Chicago, the second and third 
largest districts in the country, have recently announced small 
school strategies as well. The LAUSD, in fact, has announced 
that all secondary schools will transform into small schools 
within three years. 
Small schools are related to the discussion of adequacy and 
equity because opponents of the reform strategy often allege that 
small schools cost more than larger schools due, in part, to scale 
advantages. Proponents counter that input costs are arbitrary and 
that on a cost per graduate basis, small schools may actually cost 
less (Stiefel et al. 2000). In other work examining economies of 
scale using production functions, Andrews, Duncombe, and 
Yinger (2000) find that high schools serving 600-900 pupils may 
best balance scale advantages with the potential negative effects 
of larger schools. Research on the cost of small high schools in 
Seattle and Denver (Roza, Swartz, and Miller 2005) finds that 
small schools appear more expensive when school budgets are 
considered in isolation. However, when full costs, which include 
school budgets, real salaries, central budgets for educational 
services, and the cost of non-educational services (e.g., food 
service and transportation), are analyzed then the costs of small 
schools may not be uniformly higher. In developing a funding 
formula for New York City, care must be taken that the formulas 
do not impose undue financial burdens on small high schools.  
Decentralization of Resource Allocation Decisions 
The NYC public schools have a long history of decentralization 
followed by consolidation dating back to the 1960s (Ravitch 
1974). In 1997, the district began an experiment in school-based 
budgeting termed the Performance-Driven Budget (PDB) 
initiative (Siegel and Fruchter 2002). Under the plan, schools 
established School Leadership Teams with discretion “to 
combine multiple funding sources to split-fund staff; hire people 
full-time, part-time or on a per-session or per diem basis; and 
move money between and among personnel and non-personnel 
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categories, activities and programs” (Siegel and Fruchter 2002, 
iv). Though evidence on the effectiveness of school-based 
management and budgeting in improving student performance is 
scarce, an evaluation of the PDB initiative found evidence of 
significant performance gains in PDB pilot schools (Stiefel et al. 
2003). Though PDB is no longer in place in New York City, the 
district began a new school-based budgeting initiative in the 
2003-2004 school year that provides principals with the authority 
to budget resources within the school, in consultation with a 
School Leadership Team. The district’s experience with school-
based budgeting could provide much-needed capacity for 
implementing a decentralized budgeting approach in the future. 
While such a system is not mandatory under a weighted student 
funding formula, centralized resource allocation may mitigate the 
promise of substantial performance and equity gains.  
Transparency 
If wage differentials are the most controversial recommendation 
discussed in this brief, then increased transparency might be 
considered the least controversial. The deleterious effect that 
budgeting for average teacher salaries has on equity has resulted 
in recommendations to end the practice altogether (Moss Adams 
2003). With only one district nationally attempting to budget with 
actual salaries, strategies to increase demand for such practices 
deserve consideration. Legislation has been proposed in 
California to enhance transparency by requiring reporting of 
actual school site costs and district average costs, including “the 
percentage by which the school is above or below the district 
wide average” (California Senate Bill 687). The proposal comes 
in the wake of a 2005 report by the Education Trust-West finding 
substantial spending gaps between high- and low-poverty schools 
within many California districts.   
New York City may already be ahead of many large school 
districts in this area. The Department of Education (formerly 
known as the Board of Education) has, for a number of years, 
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been releasing School Based Expenditure Reports that report 
detailed expenditures by level (central vs. school-based), function 
(such as classroom instruction vs. instructional support), and 
student program (such as general education vs. full time special 
education). These expenditure reports use actual school-level 
salaries rather than averages to calculate expenditures. 
Conclusions 
While most litigation in New York State and elsewhere has 
focused on disparities in, and adequacy of, funding across school 
districts, it is clear that achieving equitable and adequate funding 
across districts is not the end of the story. Unless attention is paid 
to the methods used to distribute resources within districts, it is 
unlikely that sufficient resources will reach the schools and 
students who need them most. On the contrary, if additional 
funding is distributed using the methods currently in place in 
New York City and in most other large districts, inequities across 
schools could actually increase. While this brief has focused on 
New York City, it is also quite possible that a statewide remedy 
will be implemented that would dramatically increase funding in 
the state’s other large districts. While there is little available 
evidence regarding intradistrict allocations in the “Big Five” 
districts, it is likely that the same patterns are in place, though on 
a much smaller scale than in New York. 
This brief highlights some of the problems inherent in traditional 
school district allocation systems, and describes proposals for 
reform. As the discussion points out, attempts to reform 
traditional district resource allocation practices face numerous 
difficult and potentially controversial issues. Our purpose is not 
to advocate for a specific plan, but to describe the importance of 
the task and some of the challenges New York City will face in 
responding to the CFE decision. To ignore the distribution of 
resources across districts risks missing an historic opportunity to 
ensure that all students have access to the educational resources 
they need.  
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